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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a model that can contribute to the detection of legally registered firms 
defined as Mafia firms (LMFs) due to having been confiscated by judicial authorities, in 
relation to alleged connections of their owners with Italian organized crime. The model 
correctly classifies 76.41% of firms within a matched sample of 852 firm-years including LMFs 
and lawful firms. 
Furthermore, we present an analysis of financial statement characteristics of singular private 
firms which are socially irresponsible by nature and whose incentives, modus operandi and 
legal financial statement formats differ from those of listed companies. In particular, we show 
that specific accruals and earnings management proxies may provide more insight into 
accounting manipulation patterns of LMFs. 
More importantly, our paper can help practitioners and regulators identify accounting 
signals that can be used in risk assessment models or in the detection of criminal infiltrations 
and related illicit practices. 
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1 Introduction 
The Mafias, which are considered to be the most sophisticated form of criminal organization, 
also run businesses in the lawful economic sphere in which they usually invest proceeds from 
illicit trafficking (money laundering). Legally registered Mafia firms (LMFs), according to 
criminologists’ terminology, can be defined as firms that are legally registered and apparently 
engage in lawful activities but are owned by a Mafia family (Champeyrache, 2004). LMFs 
differ from lawful firms (LWFs) in three main ways (Gambetta, 1993; Fantò, 1999): the owners 
are members of a criminal organization; funding partially or totally comes from illegal 
activities; and criminal methods involving violence, intimidation or corruption might be used 
while doing business. Legal and illegal activities are therefore closely intertwined within LMFs 
as the legal activities mostly serve to launder profits stemming from illegal ones (Fantò, 1999).   
In this study we examine a sample of 198 Italian legally registered firms defined as LMFs due 
to having been confiscated at some point by judicial authorities, in relation to alleged 
connections of their owners with Italian organized crime. In particular, we first analyze whether 
accounting information of LMFs embeds some significant differences from that of similar firms 
for which there is no evidence of criminal connection (LWFs). Based on the identified 
differences, we develop a logistic regression model that can contribute to detecting LMFs and 
find practical application in forensic accounting. Among the different financial variables we 
test to predict criminal connections, we particularly focus on earnings management (EM) 
proxies. Indeed, the large amount of research on EM carried out thus far indicates that managers 
discretionally manage earnings for different purposes using a wide variety of methods. 
Specifically, they carry out special transactions, so-called real activities manipulation (RM), 
that usually affect firm’s operating activities, expenses and cash flows from operations (CFO) 
(e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006) and manipulate discretionary accruals (accrual-based EM) with no 
CFO impact (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2010). Hence, in this study we 
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examine both methods of EM as well as developing some new proxies for EM in order to reflect 
specific characteristics of LMFs. 
As far as we know there are no previous studies in the literature that seek to develop an 
accounting detection model of LMFs. Nonetheless, considering the supposed fraudulent 
purposes of LMFs such as money laundering and tax evasion we refer to previous studies that 
develop prediction models of financial statement frauds and related manipulations using 
financial and non-financial variables (Beneish, 1997; Summers and Sweeney, 1998; Lee et al., 
1999; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Erickson et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2008; Brazel et al., 
2009; Dechow et al., 2011; Perols and Lougee, 2011). A main difference between LMFs and 
firms committing financial statement fraud examined in previous research is that in the former 
the fraudulent purpose is genetic and strictly related to their existence, whereas in the latter 
fraud is subsequently committed due to specific circumstances.    
Overall, our results reveal that our detection model is able to correctly classify 76.41% of 
firms within a matched sample of 852 firm-year observations including LMFs and LWFs. More 
specifically, our model detects 76.29% of LMFs (sensitivity) and 76.53% of LWFs 
(specificity). Out-of-sample tests confirm the robustness of the predictions and an additional 
analysis shows that undetected LMFs are significantly larger than detected LMFs. Additionally, 
consistent with previous studies (Beneish, 1997; Dechow et al., 2011) on fraud prediction, our 
model shows that unadjusted specific accruals have more predictive power than discretionary 
accruals and a specific RM proxy such as abnormal material expenses is also a significant 
predictor of criminal connections.  
Our study contributes to the accounting literature given that, to our knowledge, it is the first 
to develop an accounting detection model of LMFs. More importantly, our paper can aid 
practitioners and regulators in identifying accounting signals that can be used in risk assessment 
models or in the detection of criminal infiltrations and related illicit practices. Furthermore, our 
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study shows that analysis of specific accruals and RM proxies may provide more insight into 
EM patterns of LMFs. Finally, it contributes to research on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) (e.g., Jenkins, 2006; Guthrie and Durand, 2008; Carroll and Shabana, 2010), indicating 
that socially irresponsible firms, such as LMFs, tend to engage more in EM. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces LMFs; section 3 reviews 
related research; section 4 describes the research design and sample data; section 5 presents 
empirical results and their discussion; section 6 includes concluding remarks. 
 
2 Legally Registered Mafia Firms 
For the purpose of this study, we define “organized crime” according to the legal provision of 
the article 416-bis of the Italian criminal code. Specifically, art. 416-bis states that:  
“A mafia-type association consists of three or more individuals and those who belong to it make 
use of the power of intimidation afforded by the associative bond and the state of subjugation 
and criminal silence which derives from it to commit crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly 
the management or control of economic activities, concessions, authorizations or public 
contracts and services, either to gain unjust profits or advantages for themselves or for others, 
or to prevent or obstruct the free exercise of the vote, or to procure votes for themselves or to 
others at a time or electoral consultation”. 
Criminal organizations take on new businesses in order to invest and launder significant 
financial resources coming from illegal activities. In this way, criminal organizations achieve 
high profits and social consensus by ensuring employment and income for the population in the 
areas where they exercise control of the territory. Fantò (1999) suggests that the main trait of 
LMFs is not the type of business run but the nature of the capital accumulation process that led 
to their formation as well as the strength of intimidation on which they are hinged. This mafia-
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style intimidation is a source of surplus value and competitive advantages of LMFs over LWFs. 
Arlacchi (1983) identifies the following competitive advantages of the LMFs over the LWFs: 
discouragement of competition (securing goods and raw materials at favorable prices, as well 
as orders, contracts and commercial outlets using criminal intimidation); wage compression 
(evasion of social security contributions and insurance, non-payment of overtime, denial of 
trade union rights); availability of financial resources (investment of huge proceeds coming 
from illegal activities without bearing the cost of credit).   
After the first instance of court confiscation LMFs are entrusted to one or more legal 
administrators. The legal administration is an institution designed to reinstate the legality, 
protect and manage confiscated LMFs and avoid their progressive impoverishment. The body 
currently in charge of the administration and assignment of LMFs definitively confiscated is 
the Italian agency Agenzia Nazionale Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati (ANBSC).  
 
3 Related Research 
3.1 Financial Statement Fraud  
In order to identify the most predictive variables of our detection model of LMFs, we mainly 
refer to previous studies which develop prediction models of financial statement frauds and 
related manipulations using financial and non-financial variables.  
 In this regard, Beneish (1997, 1999) estimates a model for detecting earnings manipulation 
violating generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) using financial statement variables. 
He finds a positive relation between aggregate accruals and likelihood of fraud, confirming 
Dechow et al.’s (1996) previous finding. Beneish (1999) considers that a limitation of the model 
is that it is estimated using financial information for publicly traded companies and cannot be 
reliably used to study privately-held firms.  Lee et al. (1999) subsequently find that the excess 
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of earnings over CFO (income increasing accruals) is significantly greater for a sample of 56 
firms committing financial statement fraud relative to a broad control sample of non-fraud 
firms. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) document that the specific accruals used in EM violating 
GAAP vary with the context and related incentives, and consequently provide support for the 
usefulness of examining individual accruals as well as aggregate accruals in specific EM 
contexts. Jones et al. (2008) find that some measures of discretionary accruals have predictive 
power for fraudulent restatements of financial statements in 118 firms charged by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1988 and 2001. Brazel et al. (2009) provide 
evidence that inconsistencies between nonfinancial measures and financial measure can help 
detect firms with high fraud risk.  More recently, Perols and Lougee (2011), using a sample of 
54 fraud and 54 non-fraud firms, show that fraud firms are more likely to have managed 
earnings in prior years through discretionary accruals. Finally, Dechow et al. (2011) analyze 
the characteristics of firms investigated by the SEC for misstating earnings on various 
dimensions and find that, at the time of misstatements, accrual quality is low, both financial and 
nonfinancial measures of performance are deteriorating and financing activities and related off-
balance-sheet activities are much more likely.  
 
3.2 Earnings Management within LMFs  
In most of the aforementioned studies EM, measured by several proxies, is a significant variable 
of the prediction model of financial statement frauds. Hence, we expect EM pattern, including 
both accrual-based EM and RM, to be significantly different between LMFs and LWFs. In 
particular, we examine both types of EM activities because recent studies suggest that firms 
choose between the two mechanisms using the technique that is less costly to them 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 
2012). In this regard, RM, as a departure from optimal operational decisions, is unlikely to 
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increase firms’ long-term value. Hence, some managers might find RM particularly costly 
because their firms face intense competition in the industry (Zang, 2012). However, these 
considerations may not be applicable to LMFs which usually face a weak market competition 
and benefit from significant competitive advantages (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999). Additional 
reasons may lead LMFs to engage in EM practices more than LWFs do. First, RM can be used 
to permanently reduce taxable income, even more effectively than accrual-based EM, by 
fraudulently removing certain cash flows from the balance sheets. Second, money laundering 
may require recording fictitious transactions that may lead to EM pattern detected in our 
proxies. Third, the great availability of financial resources stemming from illegal activities may 
reduce the need of bank financing and the related incentive to avoid EM practices in order to 
exhibit an acceptable earnings quality. Finally, a more intensive EM in LMFs may be fostered 
by the low level of scrutiny from outsiders of these firms compared to LWFs, in connection 
with the protection ensured by their criminal ties and infiltrators in all spheres of political and 
institutional life of the country. In this aspect, some analogy might be found with the case of 
politically connected firms studied by Chaney et al. (2011) which engage more in EM than 
firms lacking such connections. Additionally, previous studies find that a low external 
monitoring intensity is associated with a higher level of EM (Duellman et al., 2013; 
Wongsunwai, 2013). 
 
3.3 Earnings Management and Corporate Social Responsibility 
A further indication on the different EM pattern between LMFs and LWFs may come from 
some previous research on the relation between CSR and EM. Indeed, LMFs can be assumed 
to be socially irresponsible based on the widely accepted Carroll’s (1979) definition of CSR 
implying that, in order to meet social expectations, CSR firms work to make a profit, obey the 
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law, behave ethically, and be a good corporate citizen by financially supporting worthy social 
causes (Carroll, 1991). 
In practice, previous studies use a variety of methods to measure CSR. Some of these methods 
are: reputation indices or databases such as The Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
database (Waddock, 2003; Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012) which rates US listed 
companies based on several social dimensions; corporate crime (Davidson and Worrell, 1990; 
Baucus and Baucus, 1997) and tax avoidance (Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Dowling, 2013) 
indicators; content analysis of corporate publications on practices regarding environmental, 
community, employee, and consumer issues (Gray et al., 1995; Turker, 2009); scales measuring 
the CSR perceptions and values of managers (Singhapakdi et al., 1996; Ruf et al., 1998; Quazi 
and O’Brien, 2000); scales considering the extent to which businesses meet the economic, legal, 
ethical, and discretionary responsibilities imposed on them by their stakeholders (Maignan and 
Ferrell, 2000; Turker, 2009).    
We do not directly measure CSR in LMFs. Nonetheless, the CSR measures applied in 
previous research support our assumption on the social irresponsibility of LMFs. It is 
noteworthy that previous studies provide inconsistent evidence with mixed implications on the 
relation between CSR and EM (Chih et al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008; Gargouri et al., 2010; Hong 
and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Shafer, 2013). Hence, in this study we aim to provide 
additional insight into this relation.      
   
4 Research Design 
4.1 Variable Definition  
Consistent with previous studies on business failure prediction (Dambolena and Khoury, 1980; 
Karels and Prakash, 1987; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Åstebro and Winter, 2012), we explore a 
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wide range of financial characteristics of LMFs as well as their EM behavior in order to build 
the best detection model.  
 
4.1.1 Earnings Management Variables 
Prior studies (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Zang, 2012) use different proxies for RM including: 
abnormal levels of CFO, abnormal productions costs, abnormal discretionary expenses (R&D, 
advertising, and selling, general, and administrative expenditures). In Italy legal format of 
income statement classifies expenses by nature rather than by function and production costs 
cannot be distinguished from discretionary expenditures.  Therefore, we adopt three new 
measures of RM as well as the usual abnormal CFO (ABCFO): abnormal material expenses 
(ABMAT), including both raw materials and trading goods, abnormal service expenses 
(ABSERV) and abnormal personnel expenses (ABPER).  
In LMFs we expect higher ABMAT due to fraudulent sales underreporting and the record of 
fictitious transactions with related parties in order to disguise money laundering and evade 
taxes. Furthermore, we expect lower ABPER due to wage compression practices (Arlacchi, 
1983) including evasion of social security contributions. Finally, we expect lower ABSERV 
given that LMFs may be less prone to contract external services (advertising, consultancy, 
maintenance etc.) because of their aforementioned competitive advantages. 
As a measure of accrual-based EM we calculate discretionary aggregate accruals (DAC), 
discretionary revenue accruals (DREV) and a new measure of discretionary expense accruals 
(DEXP). Indeed, we consider that LMFs may simultaneously manipulate revenues and 
expenses and the related cumulative effect may not be detected in aggregate discretionary 
accrual models which do not provide information as to which components of earnings firms 
manage and how the EM is achieved (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). 
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Previous studies find that discretionary accrual models have less power to identify 
manipulation than unadjusted accrual measures supplemented with other financial statement 
ratios (Beneish, 1997; Dechow et al., 2011). Hence, we additionally test in our model, deflated 
by lagged total assets, unadjusted aggregate accruals (ACCR) and some unadjusted specific 
accruals that are more likely to be manipulated such as: change in receivables (CH_REC), 
change in inventory (CH_INV) and change in payables (CH_PAY). Following the same 
reasoning for accrual-based EM we also examine unadjusted proxies for RM by including in 
our model personnel, material and service expenses deflated by lagged total assets in order to 
determine whether they show more predictive power than commonly used abnormal RM 
measures.  
 
4.1.2 Other Variables 
Besides accrual-based EM and RM measures we test in our model the following variables, 
grouped by category, used in prior works on fraudulent financial statements and adapted to the 
singularities of LMFs. 
 
Asset composition. Previous studies (Loebbecke et al., 1989; Persons, 1995; Summer and 
Sweeney, 1998; Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011) examine asset composition with special 
regard to receivables and inventories that can be an easy target for manipulation due to the 
subjective judgment involved in their valuation. Accordingly, we measure asset composition 
with variables CATA (current assets/total assets), RECTA (receivables/total assets), INVTA 
(inventory/total assets) and INTA (intangible assets/total assets). In comparison with LWFs in 
the same industry, we expect LMFs to exhibit higher receivables to account for incoming dirty 
money and lower inventory to avoid taxes (VAT and income tax) through stock underreporting 
and fictitious purchase transactions. 
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Performance. We examine some variables expressing the reported firm financial 
performance and try to detect inconsistencies and signals of possible fraudulent manipulations. 
In particular, previous fraud research finds that firms that increase revenue fraudulently are 
more likely to have abnormally high sales growth rates (Erickson et al., 2006; Brazel et al., 
2009). As firms use resources to generate sales, unusual relations between sales and resources 
used, such as assets (capital productivity) and employees (labor productivity) may be a signal 
of fraud. Therefore, in line with previous studies (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Perols and 
Lougee, 2011), we include Revenue to Assets (REVTA) and Revenue to Employee (REVEMPL) 
as predictors in our model. We predict a negative relation between REVTA and probability of 
criminal connection (CRIME) given that in LMFs revenue may be underreported for tax evasion 
and there may be a need to quickly overinvest in assets financial resources coming from illicit 
sources without demanding an immediate competitive return. On the other hand, higher values 
of REVEMPL for LMFs relative to LWFs may be due not only to a fraudulent revenue 
manipulation but also to the underreporting of the number of employees because of the 
employment of undeclared workers. 
 
We additionally test Return on Assets (ROA) as a predictor given that we expect LMFs to be 
less profitable than LWFs. Indeed, LMFs may downward manage earnings to avoid tax as well 
as being oversized and poorly managed. Change in ROA (ABS_CH_ROA) is also added 
following Dechow et al. (2011) although, differently from the latter, we consider the absolute 
value in order to reflect higher opportunistic profitability fluctuations not reflecting the actual 
business performance. In accordance with this higher volatility pattern in LMFs, we 
furthermore include and expect higher values for absolute changes in percentages of personnel 
(ABS_CH_PERSREV), material (ABS_CH_MATREV) and service expenses 
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(ABS_CH_SERVREV) over sales and absolute changes in net income (ABS_CH_NI) and CFO 
(ABS_CH_CFO) deflated by lagged total assets.  
In line with previous fraud research (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Summers and Sweeney, 
1998; Beneish, 1999; Lee et al., 1999) we additionally include the annual absolute change in 
the ratio receivables to sales (ABS_CH_RECREV) also called days’ sales in receivables.  A 
significant variation in days’ sales in receivables could be the result of a change in credit policy 
but it may also be suggestive of a fraudulent revenue manipulation (Beneish, 1999). As we 
expect revenue manipulation to be either upwards or downwards we consider the absolute value 
of ratio variation. In order to detect a possible simultaneous expense manipulation, we also add 
a variable for the absolute change in payables to purchases (ABCH_PAY_EXP). 
 
Debt. As regards the indebtedness, we expect a positive relation between leverage (LEV) (total 
liabilities/total assets) and CRIME. LMFs may be more indebted than LWFs because they may 
report fictitious business transactions or may obtain favorable payment terms from suppliers 
using the strength of criminal intimidation (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999). More specifically, 
LMFs may prefer fictitious debt transactions to inject dirty money since regular contributions 
of capital from shareholders may raise suspicions on their origins. Nonetheless, we expect 
LMFs to show less bank indebtedness (LEVBANK) compared to the rest of LWFs because their 
access to alternative illegal source of funding may replace bank support. 
Liquidity. Regarding liquidity we include current ratio (CRATIO: current assets/current 
liabilities) (Shih et al., 2011) and the absolute value of its annual change (ABS_CH_CRATIO). 
We expect a worse and more fluctuating liquidity situation for LMFs given that current assets 
and liabilities balances may include fictitious fraudulent transactions, undermining the 
adequacy of these ratios to reflect the actual short-term debt-paying ability of the firms. 
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Growth. Previous research finds that the fast growth of a firm is an important warning of 
financial information fraud (Loebbecke et al., 1989; Beasley, 1996; Bell and Carcello, 2000; 
Shih et al., 2011).  Consistently, we include percentage increase of total assets (GROWTH) as 
a predictor in our model. Indeed, we expect LMFs to have a higher growth rate than LWFs 
because of the continuous investment of financial resources stemming from illegal activities. 
 
Non-financial. Following Dechow et al. (2011) we add a measure of difference of percentage 
change in total assets less percentage change in number of employees (DIF_GROWTH_EMPL) 
under the assumption that physical assets and employees are complements and should follow a 
similar growth pattern. We expect this measure to be significantly lower for LMFs because, 
although they may overinvest to launder dirty money, a sustained underreporting of number of 
employees may result in higher fluctuations in the number of employees and higher employee 
growth rates. Lastly, we include personnel expenses per employee (PERSEMPL) expecting a 
lower value for LMFs due not only to lower remunerations but also to the payment of 
undeclared envelope wages (Williams, 2009).   
 
4.2 Earnings Management Variable Construction  
We need to build measures of accrual-based EM and RM to input as independent variables in 
our prediction model. Hence, we calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) as the residuals from 
the following Eq. (1) based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) with a control 
for performance (Kothari et al., 2005):  
 


= 	
 + 	
1

+ 	
∆ − ∆

+ 	


+ 	 +  
 
Where in year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals; TA, ∆REV, ∆AR, PPE, and ROA 
represent total assets, changes in net revenue, changes in accounts receivables, property, plant, 
(1) 
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and equipment, and return on assets, respectively. Parameters of Eq. (1) are estimated cross-
sectionally for each industry-year with at least 15 observations in order to control for industry-
wide changes under different economic conditions (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999) that affect 
total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Kasznik, 1999). We use all active firms in AIDA (excluding LMFs) which are not listed on the 
stock exchange and with financial statements available for 10 years from 2003 to 2012.  
Consistent with previous studies of EM (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995), 
ACCR are computed as:  
 
 = ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ −  
Where: 
∆CA = change in current assets, ∆CL = change in current liabilities, ∆CASH = change in cash 
and cash equivalents, ∆STD =change in debt included in current liabilities and DEP = 
depreciation and amortization expenses. 
CFO is computed as: 
CFO = Earnings before tax – ACCR 
 
Following Caylor (2010) and Stubben (2010), we calculate discretionary revenue accruals 
(DREV) and a new measure of discretionary expense accruals (DEXP) as the residual from the 
following Eq. (4) estimated in the same way as DAC.  
 
∆(∆)

= 	
 + 	
1

+ 	
∆

+ 	
∆12

 
Where ∆AP represents change in accounts payables. 
Furthermore, we calculate the abnormal level of material expenses (ABMAT) and personnel 
expenses (ABPER) as the estimated residual of the following model adopted by Roychowdhury 
(2006) for production costs: 
 
(2) 
(3) 
(5) 
(4) 
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Where MATt and PERt are respectively material expenses and personnel expenses in year t 
that we assume mostly related to production; St is the net sales in year t; and ∆St is the change 
in net sales from year t-1 to t (St - St-1). Eq. (5) is estimated in the same way as DAC.  
Additionally, we estimate the abnormal level of service expenses (ABSERV) as the residual 
from the following Eq. (6) used by Roychowdhury (2006) for discretionary expenses and 
estimated in the same way as DAC: 
 


= 	
 +		
1

+		


+  
Finally, in line with Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) we estimate abnormal 
CFO (ABCFO) as the residual from the following Eq. (7) estimated in the same way as DAC: 
1

= 	
 +		
1

+		


+		
∆

+	 
 
4.3 Detection Model  
In order to build our detection model we start with the estimation of the following logistic 
regression model (Eq. 8) where the dependent dummy variable CRIME takes a value of 1 for 
LMFs and 0 for LWFs: 
 
Pr	(CRIME)	=	f	(EM	variables,	Asset	composition	variables,	Performance	variables,	Debt	
variables,	Liquidity	variables,	Growth	variable,	Nonfinancial	variables)	
 
Following a similar approach adopted by Dechow et al. (2011) for prediction of accounting 
misstatements, we group the variables in different categories. Table 1 describes the independent 
variables and their calculation, classifies them by category and indicates their predicted sign as 
previously discussed.  
(7) 
(6) 
(8) 
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(Insert Table 1 approximately here) 
 
4.4 Data and Sample Selection 
LMFs sample consists of 198 firms confiscated to organized crime, some of them provided by 
ANBSC and others found in online newspapers and AIDA database. The financial statements 
for all firms are obtained from AIDA, the Italian Bureau Van Dijk database. It contains 
comprehensive information on 1 million companies with a turnover above € 500,000 in Italy, 
including the indication for some of them of the confiscation status and date of confiscation. 
Firms provided by ANBSC have all been confiscated by final judgment but their small size or 
their liquidation means that only 54 out of 1,663 have financial statements available on AIDA. 
In addition, we include firms confiscated in first instance and found in AIDA database (118) 
and online newspapers (52) until reaching a total of 224. We only consider firm-year 
observations prior to the confiscation year as once confiscated and subject to legal 
administration LMFs may lose their distinctive characteristics. Hence, out of these 224 LMFs 
we eliminate 26 confiscated before 2005 whose needed financial statements are unavailable on 
AIDA which only includes years from 2003 to 2012. Finally, we end up with a sample of 198 
LMFs. Moreover, some missing data on AIDA for the calculation of several tested variables in 
some years further reduce the number of firm-year observations in the final detection model 
which ends up being  426.  
Table 2 presents the industry distribution by two-digit SIC groups of LMFs in our sample and 
AIDA population of active unlisted firms with available financial data from 2003 to 2012 in the 
same industries as LMFs.  
(Insert Table 2 approximately here) 
Compared to the population of active and unlisted firms in AIDA with available financial data 
from 2003 to 2012, the sample LMFs are especially more abundant in industry groups: building 
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construction-general contractors and operative builders (16.67% of criminal sample versus 
7.00% of population), food stores (7.58% versus 2.22%) and Motor freight transportation and 
warehousing (9.09% versus 3.69%). On the other hand, there is a lower proportion of LMFs 
mostly in wholesale trade, durable goods (11.11% versus 17.95%), business services (1.01% 
versus 6.38%) and fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment 
(0.51 versus 8.98%). 
In order to build our full sample for the model estimate, we use a matched sample design 
(Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry and Williams, 1994; Defond and Subramanyam, 1998; 
Teoh et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2005). Specifically, we match each LMF-year with a LWF-
year on fiscal reporting year, industry and size proxied by total assets.  
Table 3 summarizes the sample selection procedure that yields the 198 LMFs and the 418 
control LWFs.  
(Insert Table 3 approximately here) 
Table 4 includes number of LMFs by confiscation year. It can be seen that 2012 is the year 
with largest number of confiscated firms and more than 50% of firms have been confiscated 
from 2011 to 2013. 
(Insert Table 4 approximately here) 
5 Results and Discussions 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for each variable considered for the development of our 
detection model comparing LMF-years to their matched LWF-years before confiscation. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their distributions to 
avoid the influence of outliers. 
(Insert Table 5 approximately here) 
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As regards accrual-based EM variables, it is noteworthy that, as expected, ABSDAC, 
ABSDREV and ABSDEXP are significantly (p<0.01) higher for LMFs relative to LWFs, 
suggesting a higher degree of aggregate accrual-based, revenue-accrual based and expense 
accrual-based EM, respectively. As regards RM variables, variable ABMAT is positive and 
significantly (p<0.01) higher for LMFs indicating an income-decreasing RM that is offset by 
an income-increasing RM suggested by significantly (p<0.05) lower variables ABPER and 
ABSERV. Significantly (p<0.05) lower variable ABCFO for LMFs provides evidence that the 
cumulative effect of RM is a reduction of CFO. As regards unadjusted EM proxies, variables 
CH_REC, CH_INV and CH_PAY, each representing a different specific accrual, are 
significantly (p<0.05) higher for LMFs. Similar to the results of related RM proxies, variables 
PERTA and SERVTA are significantly (p<0.01) lower and variable MATTA is significantly 
(p<0.01) higher for LMFs. As regards asset composition variables, marginally significantly 
(p<0.10) higher variable CATA documents a higher liquidity in asset composition of LMFs. 
This is partially due to higher receivables, as showed by significantly (p<0.05) higher variable 
RECTA, and despite the significantly (p<0.05) lower variable INVTA. As far as performance 
variables are concerned, profitability variable ROA is significantly (p<0.01) lower for LMFs 
and more volatile, as suggested by significantly (p<0.05) higher variable ABS_CH_ROA. 
Significantly (p<0.05) lower variables SERVREV and PERSREV and significantly (p<0.01) 
higher variable MATREV for LMFs provide further evidence on lower service and personnel 
expenses and higher material expenses with respect to sales, respectively. Significantly 
(p<0.01) higher variables ABS_CH_PERSREV, ABS_CH_MATREV, ABS_CH_SERVREV, 
ABS_CH_NI, ABS_CH_RECREV and ABS_CH_PAYEXP  for LMFs provide further evidence 
on the higher volatility of their reported performance which foster suspicions on opportunistic 
and fraudulent manipulations. As expected, LMFs are significantly (p<0.01) more leveraged 
(LEV), although their bank indebtedness (LEVBANK) is significantly (p<0.01) lower. Variable 
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CRATIO is significantly (p<0.01) lower for LMFs indicating a theoretical weakness in the 
ability to meet their short term debt obligations. It is worth noting the expected significantly 
(p<0.01) higher total assets growth rate (GROWTH) of LMFs. Finally, according to our 
expectations, non-financial variable PERSEMPL is significantly (p<0.01) lower for LMFs 
providing indication of wage compression practices (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999) and non-
financial variable DIF_GROWTH_EMPL is negative and significantly (p<0.01) lower for 
LMFs. 
Table 6 displays Pearson correlations among EM related variables taken into account for 
developing our detection model. High correlations identified among some variables warn 
against their simultaneous inclusion in the detection model.  
(Insert Table 6 approximately here) 
 
5.2 Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
We estimate a cross-sectional logistic regression to determine whether the variables examined 
in univariate tests are jointly significant in detecting LMF-years. We use a stepwise backward 
elimination technique to arrive at a parsimonious model that best predicts LMFs within our 
sample. The model is displayed in Table 7.  
(Insert Table 7 approximately here) 
The chi-square test indicates the significance of the overall model. As showed at the bottom 
of the Table 7, using a probability cut-off point of 0.50 the model correctly classifies 76.29% 
of the total LMF-years (sensitivity) and 76.53% of the total LWF-years (specificity) with a total 
rate of 76.41 firm-years correctly classified. Similar to previous studies (Lisowsky, 2010; 
Dimmock and Gerken, 2012; Åstebro and Winter, 2012), to illustrate the possible tradeoffs 
between false positives and correctly predicted LMFs at various probability cutoff-points, Fig. 
1 shows a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the detection model. The area under 
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the ROC Curve of our estimated model is approximately 0.82, indicating strong discriminatory 
power of the model to identify LMFs (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). 
(Insert Figure 1 approximately here) 
Fig. 2 shows the graph of sensitivity and specificity for each probability cut-off point for the 
detection model of Table 7. A reduction of the cut-off from 0.50 to 0.35 scores a sensitivity of 
approximately 90% and a specificity of approximately 60%. Indeed, considering the higher 
misclassification cost for LMFs relative to LWFs, reducing the cut-off point from 0.5 might be 
a convenient option.  
(Insert Figure 2 approximately here) 
Turning to the results of the estimated detection model in Table 7, it is noteworthy that, within 
the accrual-based EM variables, coefficients on CH_REC and CH_INV are negative and 
significant (p<0.05) supporting previous studies which find that unadjusted specific accruals 
have more power to identify fraudulent manipulations than discretionary accruals (Beneish, 
1997; Dechow et al., 2011). The former are thus preferable because of the fewer calculation 
efforts they require. Regarding variable ABMAT, its coefficient is positive and significant 
(p<0.01), as expected, providing evidence that LMFs are more likely to upward manage 
material expenses than LWFs do. On the other hand, positive and significant (p<0.01) 
coefficient on INTA and negative and significant (p<0.05) coefficient on INVTA respectively 
suggest that LMFs are more likely to report higher intangible assets and lower inventory with 
respect to total assets.  
As far as performance variables are concerned, coefficient on REVTA is negative and 
significant (p<0.01) as expected. Furthermore, negative and significant (p<0.01) coefficient on 
SERVREV suggests lower service expenses with respect to sales in LMFs. For the rest of 
variables of the models, the results of univariate tests are mostly confirmed and the same 
considerations apply. Some exceptions are variables ABS_CH_MATREV and ABS_CH_NI 
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whose coefficients are not significant at conventional levels in spite of improving the predictive 
power of the model. Another exception is the variable REVEMPL whose coefficient is positive 
and significant (p<0.05) apparently suggesting a higher labor productivity in LMFs relative to 
LWFs.  Nonetheless, we are more inclined to believe that this result is mainly due to the 
underreporting of number of employees.  
Finally, Table 8 shows the illicit activities which may be reflected by the variables included 
in the final detection model. Our analysis is mostly based on the assumptions made in the 
variable definition section 4.1.  Money laundering as well as labor, income and value added tax 
evasion are assumed to be the primary incentives which should be considered whether 
additional variables are included in the model in order to improve its predictive power.  
 (Insert Table 8 approximately here) 
 
5.3 Robustness Tests 
In this subsection we test whether the within-sample predictions are robust out-of-sample 
through a cross-validation. For this purpose we estimate three detection models excluding in 
turns LMFs confiscated in each year between 2011 and 2013 with their control firms and 
predicting values for each excluded hold-out sample. Related estimates and detection accuracy 
rates for each yearly hold-out sample are presented in Table 9.  
(Insert Table 9 approximately here) 
The results indicate that the overall predictive power of the models at cut-off of 0.50 is 
69.55%, 71.57% and 77.91% in the hold-out samples of LMFs confiscated in 2013, 2012 and 
2011, respectively.  Due to the relatively small difference from our tested model we consider 
that the out-of-sample tests support the robustness of our detection model. 
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5.4 Analysis of Undetected LMFs 
We perform a further analysis of LMFs undetected by our model in order to determine whether 
they present some significant differences from detected LMFs.  
Table 10 shows the industry distribution of undetected and detected LMFs. An untabulated 
Pearson Chi-squared test of independence indicates that industry distribution of undetected 
LMFs is not significantly different from that of detected LMFs. 
(Insert Table 10 approximately here) 
Table 11 presents univariate tests of differences between undetected and detected LMFs 
including detection model variables and two additional variables measuring firm size.  
(Insert Table 11 approximately here) 
It is noteworthy that undetected LMFs are significantly (p<0.05) larger than detected LMFs 
in terms of both logarithm of total assets and number of employees. Indeed, larger firms are 
more easily scrutinized by regulators (Siregar and Utama, 2008) and may have more resources 
and incentives to better disguise illicit practices by enhancing the rationality and economic 
credibility of accounting information (Compin, 2008). Interestingly, as regards detection model 
variables, ABMAT is significantly (p<0.01) lower for undetected LMFs. Furthermore, 
undetected LMFs exhibit a significantly (p<0.01) lower total indebtedness (LEV) and a 
significantly (p<0.01) higher bank indebtedness (LEVBANK). Finally, significantly (p<0.01) 
higher variables PERSEMPL and DIF_GROWTH_EMPL for undetected LMFs may indicate 
less adoption of wage compression practices (Arlacchi, 1983). 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this study we develop a logistic regression model that can contribute to the detection of LMFs 
in Italy based on their financial statement characteristics. Overall, our results reveal that our 
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model is able to detect 76.29% of LMF-years (sensitivity) and 76.53% of LWF-years 
(specificity) within a matched sample of 852 firm-years including both LMFs and LWFs.  
As a primary contribution, our paper can aid practitioners and regulators in identifying 
accounting signals that can be used in risk assessment models or in the detection of criminal 
infiltrations and related illicit practices. In particular, a high probability score resulting from the 
model could be used as a further selection criterion of firms to be regularly inspected in order 
to unmask illegal activities and as a red flag strengthening existing evidence of Mafia activities.  
Indeed, because of its limitations, the model cannot by itself support allegations of Mafia 
infiltrations within a firm without additional proofs.  
We recognize that in the future our detection model might need to be adapted to the 
continuous evolution of Mafia practices. Nonetheless, we do not expect any significant change 
in the practices of LMFs as an immediate reaction aiming to undermine the effectiveness of an 
auditing procedure based on our model. Indeed, LMFs are already engaged in disguising their 
illicit practices and the patterns disclosed by our model are a necessary consequence of these 
attempts. Furthermore, confiscations of LMFs are mostly based on investigations carried out 
by authorities on parallel illicit activities and criminal bonds of the owners that significantly 
benefit LMFs by granting them sources of funding and business opportunities. The imputation 
of the owners for mafia-type association automatically implies the confiscation of all their 
assets including firms. Hence, a change in the internal LMFs practices would not prevent 
authorities from accomplishing their investigations.  
However, our findings are subject to several limitations. We cannot be completely sure that 
control sample LWFs are not connected to criminal organizations despite having never been 
confiscated. Nonetheless, considering the large population of 78,340 firms from which control 
sample LWFs have been selected, we assume a very low probability of a significant presence 
of LMFs in our control sample. Although we conduct extensive out-of-sample tests, we cannot 
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reject the possibility that our detection model is biased because undetected LMFs are 
unobservable and smaller LMFs unavailable on AIDA are excluded. Furthermore, there could 
be selection biases in LMFs pursued by Italian authorities.  
We propose several opportunities for future research. First, other detection techniques 
(multiple discriminant analysis, neural networks, decision trees, etc.) could be tested in order 
to find out whether they perform better than our logistic model. Second, additional financial 
and non-financial information from other sources may be considered to improve the predictive 
power of the model. Third, the model could be applied to other types of illegal firms such as 
simple tax evaders that, although not directly connected to any criminal organization, may have 
behavior patterns similar to LMFs. Finally, this study could be replicated in other countries, 
where organized crime is deeply rooted, in order to determine whether the results are confirmed 
in a different cultural, legal and institutional context. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Description Pred. 
Sign 
Calculation 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT   
Aggregate accrual-based:    
DAC Discretionary accruals ? Residuals of modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) with additional 
control for firm performance (Kothari et 
al., 2005) (Eq. 1) 
ABSDAC Absolute value of 
discretionary accruals 
+ Absolute value of DAC 
Revenue accrual-based:   
DREV Discretionary revenue 
accruals 
+ Residuals from Caylor's (2010) model 
(Eq. 5)  
ABSDREV Absolute value of 
discretionary revenue 
accruals 
+ Absolute value of DREV 
Expense accrual-based:   
DEXP Discretionary expense 
accruals 
+ Residuals from Eq. (6) 
ABSDEXP Absolute value of 
discretionary expense 
accruals 
+ Absolute value of DEXP 
RM:    
ABMAT Abnornal material 
expenses 
+ Residuals from Eq. (7) 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Description Pred. 
Sign 
Calculation 
ABPER Abnormal personnel 
expenses 
– Residuals from Eq. (7) 
ABSERV Abnormal service 
expenses 
– Residuals from Eq. (8) 
ABCFO Abnormal CFO ? Residuals from Eq. (9) (Roychowdhury, 
2006)  
Unadjusted EM proxies:   
ACCR Total accruals deflated by 
lagged total assets 
? Total accruals Eq. (3)/total assetst-1 
CH_REC Change in receivables 
deflated by lagged total 
assets 
+ (Receivablest - receivablest-1)/total 
assetst-1 
CH_INV Change in inventory 
deflated by lagged total 
assets 
? (Inventoryt - inventoryt-1)/total assetst-1 
CH_PAY Change in payables 
deflated by lagged total 
assets 
+ (Payablest - payablest-1)/total assetst-1 
PERTA Personnel expenses to 
lagged total assets 
– Personnel expenses/total assetst-1 
MATTA Material expenses to 
lagged total assets 
+ Material expenses/total assetst-1 
SERVTA Service expenses to lagged 
total assets 
– Service expenses/total assetst-1 
ASSET COMPOSITION:   
INTA Intangible assets to total 
assets 
? Intangible assets/total assets 
CATA Current assets to total 
assets 
? Current assets/total assets 
RECTA Receivables to total assets + Receivables/total assets 
INVTA Inventory to total assets – Inventory/total assets 
PERFORMANCE:    
ROA Return on assets – Earnings before interests and 
extraordinary items/total assets 
ABS_CH_ROA Absolute value of change 
in ROA 
+ Absolute value of: ROAt-ROAt-1 
REVTA Revenue to assets  – Revenuet/total assetst-1 
SERVREV Service expenses to sales – Service expenses/sales 
MATREV Material expenses to sales + Material expenses/sales 
PERSREV Personnel expenses to 
sales 
– Personnel expenses/sales 
ABS_CH_PERSREV Absolute value of change 
in personnel expenses over 
sales 
+ Absolute value of: (Personnel 
expenses/sales)t - (Personnel 
expenses/sales)t-1 
ABS_CH_MATREV Absolute value of change 
in material expenses over 
sales 
+ Absolute value of: (material 
expenses/sales)t - (material 
expenses/sales)t-1 
ABS_CH_SERVREV Absolute value of change 
in service expenses over 
sales 
+ Absolute value of: (service 
expenses/sales)t - (service 
expenses/sales)t-1 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Description Pred. 
Sign 
Calculation 
ABS_CH_NI Absolute value of change 
in net income  
+ Absolute value of: (net incomet-net 
incomet-1)/total assetst-1 
ABS_CH_CFO Absolute value of change 
in CFO 
+ Absolute value of: (CFOt-CFOt-1)/total 
assetst-1 
ABS_CH_RECREV Absolute value of change 
in receivables to sales  
+ Absolute value of: (receivables/sales)t-
(receivables/sales)t-1 
ABS_CH_PAYEXP Absolute value of change 
in payables to purchases 
+ Absolute value of: (payables/expenses)t-
(payables/expenses)t-1 
DEBT:    
LEV Leverage + Total liabilities/total assets 
LEVBANK Bank indebtedness – Bank debts/total assets 
LIQUIDITY:    
CRATIO Current ratio – Current assets/current liabilities 
ABS_CH_CRATIO Absolute value of change 
in current ratio 
+ Absolute value of: CRATIOt - CRATIOt-1 
GROWTH:    
GROWTH Percentage change in total 
assets 
+ (Total assetst-total assetst-1)/total assetst-1 
NON-FINANCIAL:    
PERSEMPL Personnel expenses to 
employees 
– Personnel expenses/number of 
employees 
REVEMPL Revenue to employee  + Revenuet/employeest-1 
DIF_GROWTH_EMPL Percentage change in total 
assets less percentage 
change in number of 
employees  
– GROWTH-(employeest-employeest-
1)/employeest-1 
YEAR Fiscal year ? Dummy variables representing the fiscal 
year  
IND Industry ? Dummy variables representing industry 
defined by the two-digit SIC code  
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Table 2: Industry distribution of LMFs and AIDA population of active unlisted firms with 
available financial data from 2003 to 2012 restricted to LMFs industries (LWFs) 
Sic 
code 
Industry description AIDA 
population 
LMFs 
  Freq. % Freq
. 
% 
01 Agricultural production-crops 644 0.82% 4 2.02% 
14 Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic minerals, 
except fuels 
463 0.59% 8 4.04% 
15 Building construction-general contractors and 
operative builders 
5,486 7.00% 33 16.67% 
16 Heavy construction other than building 
construction-contractors 
524 0.67% 3 1.52% 
17 Construction-special trade contractors 4,032 5.15% 8 4.04% 
20 Food and kindred products 3,224 4.12% 6 3.03% 
25 Furniture and fixtures manufacturing 829 1.06% 3 1.52% 
28 Chemicals and allied products manufacturing 1,598 2.04% 1 0.51% 
29 Petroleum refining and related industries 158 0.20% 2 1.01% 
32 Stone, clay, glass and concrete products 
manufacturing 
1,960 2.50% 11 5.56% 
34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
transportation equipment 
7,038 8.98% 1 0.51% 
42 Motor freight transportation and warehousing 2,894 3.69% 18 9.09% 
44 Water transportation 586 0.75% 1 0.51% 
45 Transportation by air 95 0.12% 1 0.51% 
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47 Transportation services 1,884 2.40% 3 1.52% 
49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 1,419 1.81% 6 3.03% 
50 Wholesale trade, durable goods 14,064 17.95% 22 11.11% 
51 Wholesale trade, nondurable goods wholesale 
dealing in 
7,821 9.98% 17 8.59% 
52 Building materials, hardware, garden supply, and 
mobile home dealers wholesale dealing in 
1,018 1.30% 1 0.51% 
53 General merchandise stores 324 0.41% 1 0.51% 
54 Food stores 1,737 2.22% 15 7.58% 
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations 536 0.68% 2 1.01% 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 1,920 2.45% 2 1.01% 
57 Home furniture, furnishings, and equipment stores 872 1.11% 1 0.51% 
58 Eating and drinking places 1,007 1.29% 2 1.01% 
59 Miscellaneous retail 1,475 1.88% 1 0.51% 
65 Real estate 2,239 2.86% 6 3.03% 
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging 
places 
1,600 2.04% 3 1.52% 
72 Personal services 327 0.42% 1 0.51% 
73 Business services 5,001 6.38% 2 1.01% 
75 Automotive repair, services, and parking 882 1.13% 1 0.51% 
79 Amusement and recreation services 744 0.95% 4 2.02% 
80 Health services 1,165 1.49% 5 2.53% 
81 Legal services 19 0.02% 1 0.51% 
87 Engineering, accounting, research, management, 
and related services 
2,755 3.52% 2 1.01% 
Total 78,340 100% 198 100% 
Source: AIDA database, 2013. 
Table 3: Sample selection  
 Number of firms 
LMFs sample  
LMFs definitively confiscated at November 5th 2012 provided by 
ANBSC 
1,663 
Less: LMFs provided by ANBSC with data unavailable on AIDA 
database 
-1,609 
Add: LMFs found in AIDA database with status confiscated 118 
Add: confiscated LMFs found in online newspapers with data available 
on AIDA 
52 
Less: LMFs confiscated before 2005 with pre-confiscation data 
unavailable on AIDA 
-26 
Final LMFs sample 198 
LMF-years in detection model 426 
 
 
LWFs control sample  
Aida population of active and unlisted firms with available financial 
data from 2003 to 2012 in the same two-digit SIC industries as LMFs 
78,340 
Less: LWFs not matched to LMFs by year, sector and size -77,922 
Final LWFs in detection model 418 
LWF-years in detection model 426 
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Source: ANBSC and AIDA database, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: LMFs by confiscation year 
Confiscation year Number of confiscated LMFs Percentage 
2005 1 0.51% 
2006 9 4.55% 
2007 18 9.09% 
2008 24 12.12% 
2009 19 9.60% 
2010 24 12.12% 
2011 35 17.68% 
2012 37 18.69% 
2013 31 15.66% 
Total 198 100.00% 
 
Source: ANBSC and AIDA database, 2013. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and pairwise variable comparison between LMFs and LWFs 
  LMFs LWFs Difference 
(LMFs - LWFs) 
Variable N Mean Median Mean Median Pred. 
Sign 
Mean Median Test 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT          
Aggregate accrual-based:          
DAC 516 0.012 -0.004 -0.006 0.003 ? 0.018 -0.007  
ABSDAC 516 0.188 0.115 0.145 0.090 + 0.043 0.026 *** 
Revenue accrual-based:          
DREV 460 0.031 0.016 0.024 -0.005 + 0.007 0.020  
ABSDREV 460 0.146 0.089 0.115 0.064 + 0.032 0.026 *** 
Expense accrual-based:          
DEXP 478 0.028 0.009 0.001 -0.007 + 0.026 0.017 ** 
ABSDEXP 478 0.146 0.091 0.108 0.062 + 0.038 0.028 *** 
RM:          
ABMAT 601 0.107 0.061 -0.018 -0.017 + 0.125 0.078 *** 
ABPER 601 -0.024 -0.047 -0.012 -0.024 – -0.012 -0.023 ** 
ABSERV 741 -0.012 -0.072 0.005 -0.035 – -0.017 -0.037 *** 
ABCFO 543 -0.026 -0.005 0.013 -0.002 ? -0.039 -0.002 ** 
Unadjusted EM proxies:          
ACCR 543 0.012 -0.020 -0.015 -0.017 ? 0.028 -0.003  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and pairwise variable comparison between LMFs and LWFs 
  LMFs LWFs Difference 
(LMFs - LWFs) 
Variable N Mean Median Mean Median Pred. 
Sign 
Mean Median Test 
CH_REC 625 0.097 0.025 0.053 0.013 + 0.044 0.012 *** 
CH_INV 741 0.039 0.000 0.015 0.000 ? 0.024 0.000 *** 
CH_PAY 552 0.075 0.014 0.040 0.013 + 0.034 0.001 ** 
PERTA 741 0.202 0.108 0.214 0.144 – -0.012 -0.036 *** 
MATTA 741 0.945 0.442 0.724 0.380 + 0.221 0.063 *** 
SERVTA 741 0.391 0.182 0.437 0.254 – -0.046 -0.073 *** 
ASSET COMPOSITION          
INTA 967 0.035 0.004 0.025 0.004 ? 0.010 0.000 * 
CATA 966 0.743 0.819 0.734 0.807 ? 0.010 0.012 * 
RECTA 875 0.389 0.380 0.374 0.356 + 0.015 0.024 ** 
INVTA 967 0.184 0.054 0.185 0.097 – -0.001 -0.044 ** 
PERFORMANCE          
ROA 967 0.040 0.035 0.059 0.041 – -0.018 -0.007 *** 
ABS_CH_ROA 741 0.051 0.024 0.041 0.021 + 0.010 0.003 ** 
REVTA 741 1.585 1.041 1.503 1.165 – 0.082 -0.124  
SERVREV 908 0.292 0.176 0.340 0.266 – -0.048 -0.090 *** 
MATREV 908 0.550 0.564 0.440 0.434 + 0.110 0.130 *** 
PERSREV 908 0.171 0.108 0.168 0.124 – 0.003 -0.016 ** 
ABS_CH_PERSREV 684 0.057 0.024 0.033 0.013 + 0.023 0.011 *** 
ABS_CH_MATREV 684 0.153 0.050 0.087 0.028 + 0.066 0.022 *** 
ABS_CH_SERVREV 684 0.121 0.033 0.083 0.026 + 0.038 0.007 *** 
ABS_CH_NI 741 0.046 0.013 0.032 0.013 + 0.014 0.000 *** 
ABS_CH_CFO 363 0.265 0.137 0.221 0.129 + 0.043 0.008 * 
ABS_CH_RECREV 571 0.299 0.111 0.169 0.056 + 0.131 0.054 *** 
ABS_CH_PAYEXP 547 0.357 0.137 0.204 0.065 + 0.153 0.072 *** 
DEBT          
LEV 967 0.774 0.840 0.684 0.736 + 0.090 0.103 *** 
LEVBANK 807 0.134 0.046 0.164 0.100 – -0.030 -0.054 *** 
LIQUIDITY          
CRATIO 962 1.365 1.054 1.457 1.175 – -0.092 -0.122 *** 
ABS_CH_CRATIO 734 0.401 0.118 0.317 0.102 + 0.084 0.015  
GROWTH          
GROWTH 741 0.242 0.110 0.102 0.036 + 0.140 0.074 *** 
NON-FINANCIAL          
PERSEMPL 908 27.251 26.373 34.192 32.173 – -6.941 -5.800 *** 
REVEMPL 703 781.379 280.656 533.141 274.466 + 248.238 6.190  
DIF_GROWTH_EMPL 697 -0.114 -0.014 0.037 0.033 – -0.151 -0.048 *** 
 
Notes: The sample full period spans 2003–2012. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the differences in medians 
between paired samples. See Table 1 for variable definitions. We apply non parametric Wilcoxon 
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signed-rank test rather than Student's t-test for differences in means given that untabulated 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality show non-normality of most of the variables. However, both tests 
mostly perform the same.  
 
. 
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Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7: Logistic regression comparing LMFs with LWFs 
Variable Pred. Sign Estimate p-value 
CH_REC + -1.249 0.024 
CH_INV ? -2.618 0.015 
ABMAT + 0.991 0.009 
PERTA – -0.610 0.249 
INTA ? 4.640 0.002 
CATA ? -0.630 0.382 
RECTA + 0.838 0.199 
INVTA – -2.101 0.015 
REVTA – -0.335 0.003 
SERVREV – -1.383 0.008 
ABS_CH_PERSREV + 4.931 0.005 
ABS_CH_MATREV + 0.849 0.183 
ABS_CH_NI + 1.361 0.400 
LEV + 4.383 0.000 
LEVBANK – -3.554 0.000 
GROWTH + 1.887 0.000 
PERSEMPL – -0.023 0.000 
REVEMPL + 0.000 0.030 
DIF_GROWTH_EMPL – -0.570 0.003 
IND dummies  Yes  
YEAR dummies  Yes  
Intercept  -0.604 0.493 
Number of observations  852  
LR chi2(57)  271.89 0.000 
Pseudo R2   0.230  
Area under ROC Curve  0.816  
Correctly classified (cut-off = 0.50)    
LMFs  76.29%  
LWFs  76.53%  
Overall   76.41%  
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 8: Illicit activities and related reflecting variables of the detection model 
Illicit activity Reflecting variables 
Fraudulent accounting manipulations CH_REC; CH_INV; ABMAT; INTA; CATA; 
RECTA; INVTA; REVTA; SERVREV; 
ABS_CH_MATREV; ABS_CH_NI; GROWTH 
Money laundering through fictitious 
transactions 
CH_REC; ABMAT; CATA; RECTA; REVTA; 
SERVREV; ABS_CH_MATREV; 
ABS_CH_NI; LEV; LEVBANK; GROWTH; 
DIF_GROWTH_EMPL 
Income tax/ value added tax evasion CH_REC; CH_INV; ABMAT; INVTA; 
REVTA; ABS_CH_MATREV; ABS_CH_NI 
Wage compression including evasion of social 
security contributions 
PERTA; ABS_CH_PERSREV; PERSEMPL; 
REVEMPL; DIF_GROWTH_EMPL 
Supplier intimidation LEV 
 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 9:  Logistic regressions excluding hold-out samples  
 2013 excluded 2012 excluded 2011 excluded 
Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
CH_REC -1.532 0.022 -1.460 0.017 -1.579 0.012 
CH_INV -1.855 0.167 -1.836 0.137 -2.691 0.024 
ABMAT 0.887 0.060 1.173 0.007 0.770 0.074 
PERTA -2.542 0.000 -0.261 0.675 -0.186 0.749 
INTA 2.210 0.187 5.350 0.002 5.762 0.001 
CATA -0.575 0.527 -0.775 0.349 0.182 0.817 
RECTA 0.347 0.683 0.996 0.164 0.811 0.255 
INVTA -3.430 0.002 -2.063 0.030 -1.995 0.036 
REVTA -0.164 0.257 -0.236 0.054 -0.300 0.009 
SERVREV -2.028 0.001 -0.830 0.178 -1.326 0.023 
ABS_CH_PERSREV 3.079 0.154 6.520 0.001 3.518 0.079 
ABS_CH_MATREV 1.661 0.052 -0.028 0.968 1.729 0.016 
ABS_CH_NI 3.378 0.097 0.196 0.917 1.417 0.422 
LEV 4.589 0.000 4.409 0.000 3.602 0.000 
LEVBANK -4.182 0.000 -3.091 0.000 -3.530 0.000 
GROWTH 2.112 0.000 1.779 0.001 1.836 0.000 
PERSEMPL -0.025 0.000 -0.025 0.000 -0.022 0.000 
REVEMPL 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.016 
DIF_GROWTH_EMPL -0.842 0.001 -0.555 0.009 -0.540 0.010 
IND dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept 0.098 0.927 -0.799 0.393 -1.173 0.267 
Number of observations 632  648  680  
LR chi2 221.8 0.000 207.9 0.000 196.51 0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.253  0.231  0.2085  
Area under ROC Curve 0.827  0.816  0.806  
  
    
Correctly classified hold-out samples (cut-off = 0.50):  
Confiscation year 2013  2012  2011  
Number of observations 220  204  172  
LMFs 66.36%  75.49%  81.40%  
LWFs 72.73%  67.65%  74.42%  
Overall  69.55%  71.57%  77.91%  
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 10: Industry distribution of undetected and detected LMFs 
Sic code Industry description Undetected LMFs Detected LMFs 
 
 Freq. % Freq. % 
01 Agricultural production-crops 3 2.97% 4 1.23% 
14 Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic 
minerals, except fuels 
5 4.95% 13 4.00% 
15 Building construction-general 
contractors and operative builders 
21 20.79% 50 15.38% 
16 Heavy construction other than 
building construction-contractors 
2 1.98% 4 1.23% 
17 Construction-special trade contractors 3 2.97% 22 6.77% 
20 Food and kindred products 2 1.98% 5 1.54% 
25 Furniture and fixtures manufacturing 2 1.98% 11 3.38% 
28 Chemicals and allied products 
manufacturing 
0 0.00% 1 0.31% 
29 Petroleum refining and related 
industries 
1 0.99% 6 1.85% 
32 Stone, clay, glass and concrete 
products manufacturing 
7 6.93% 21 6.46% 
34 Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and transportation 
equipment 
0 0.00% 5 1.54% 
42 Motor freight transportation and 
warehousing 
11 10.89% 32 9.85% 
44 Water transportation 2 1.98% 4 1.23% 
47 Transportation services 1 0.99% 2 0.62% 
49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 5 4.95% 9 2.77% 
50 Wholesale trade, durable goods 16 15.84% 47 14.46% 
51 Wholesale trade, nondurable goods 
wholesale dealing in 
9 8.91% 27 8.31% 
53 General merchandise stores 0 0.00% 1 0.31% 
54 Food stores 4 3.96% 10 3.08% 
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline 
service stations 
0 0.00% 6 1.85% 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 0 0.00% 4 1.23% 
59 Miscellaneous retail 0 0.00% 2 0.62% 
65 Real estate 0 0.00% 5 1.54% 
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and 
other lodging places 
0 0.00% 5 1.54% 
72 Personal services 1 0.99% 2 0.62% 
73 Business services 2 1.98% 3 0.92% 
75 Automotive repair, services, and 
parking 
0 0.00% 6 1.85% 
79 Amusement and recreation services 0 0.00% 1 0.31% 
80 Health services 2 1.98% 8 2.46% 
81 Legal services 1 0.99% 6 1.85% 
87 Engineering, accounting, research, 
management, and related services 
1 0.99% 3 0.92% 
Total 101 100.00% 325 100.00% 
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Table 11: Comparison of variables between undetected and detected LMFs 
 Undetected LMFs Detected LMFs Difference 
(Undetected - Detected) 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median Test 
Total assets (logarithm) 101 8.508 8.493 325 8.216 8.222 0.291 0.271 ** 
Number employees 101 30.943 13.000 325 23.455 11.000 7.488 2.000 ** 
CH_REC 101 0.049 0.024 325 0.084 0.034 -0.035 -0.010  
CH_INV 101 0.025 0.000 325 0.006 0.000 0.019 0.000 ** 
ABMAT 101 -0.023 -0.011 325 0.157 0.111 -0.180 -0.122 *** 
PERTA 101 0.212 0.101 325 0.190 0.106 0.023 -0.005  
INTA 101 0.015 0.001 325 0.048 0.004 -0.032 -0.003 *** 
CATA 101 0.759 0.867 325 0.725 0.766 0.034 0.100 ** 
RECTA 101 0.464 0.469 325 0.452 0.476 0.012 -0.006  
INVTA 101 0.170 0.050 325 0.140 0.042 0.031 0.008  
REVTA 101 1.338 1.042 325 1.546 1.043 -0.209 -0.001  
SERVREV 101 0.362 0.226 325 0.243 0.169 0.119 0.057 *** 
ABS_CH_PERSREV 101 0.039 0.018 325 0.054 0.024 -0.015 -0.005  
ABS_CH_MATREV 101 0.081 0.022 325 0.149 0.056 -0.068 -0.034 *** 
ABS_CH_NI 101 0.030 0.013 325 0.040 0.012 -0.010 0.001  
LEV 101 0.679 0.709 325 0.794 0.841 -0.115 -0.132 *** 
LEVBANK 101 0.192 0.166 325 0.147 0.075 0.045 0.091 *** 
GROWTH 101 0.084 0.065 325 0.189 0.087 -0.104 -0.022  
PERSEMPL 101 38.732 30.529 325 27.641 26.343 11.092 4.187 *** 
REVEMPL 101 522.278 253.141 325 848.794 293.083 -326.516 -39.942  
DIF_GROWTH_EMPL 101 0.080 0.029 325 -0.164 -0.063 0.244 0.092 *** 
 
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed 
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test for the differences in medians. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Fig.1.This figure shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the logistic regression 
results of Table 7. The ROC curve shows the relation between the proportion of LMFs detected and 
the proportion of false positives for all possible classification probability cut-off points.  
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Fig.2.This figure shows the graph of sensitivity and specificity versus probability cutoff-points. 
 
